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Abstract
Subjects typically choose to be presented with stimuli that predict the existence of future reinforcements. This so-called
‘observing behavior’ is evident in many species under various experimental conditions, including if the choice is expensive,
or if there is nothing that subjects can do to improve their lot with the information gained. A recent study showed that the
activities of putative midbrain dopamine neurons reflect this preference for observation in a way that appears to challenge
the common prediction-error interpretation of these neurons. In this paper, we provide an alternative account according to
which observing behavior arises from a small, possibly Pavlovian, bias associated with the operation of working memory.
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Introduction
Animal behavior all too rarely follows the precepts of simple
theories such as normatively optimal choice. Prominent
examples of this arise in the florid fancies of Breland &
Breland’s animal actors [1], or in the complexities of negative
automaintenance or omission schedules [2–4]. Such failures and
irrationalities have been important sources of theory revision
and refinement, for instance leading to suggestions about
the competition and cooperation of multiple systems of control
[5–7], some instrumental and adaptive; others Pavlovian and
hard-wired.
In this paper, we study one apparent departure from optimality,
namely a type of ‘observing behavior’ [8,9], which has been the
subject of a recent important electrophysiological study [10]. In
brief, subjects are programmed to receive either a large or small
reward, with its size being determined stochastically. When faced
with the choice of finding out (by being presented with a suitably
distinctive cue) sooner rather than later which of the two rewards
they will ultimately receive, subjects prefer to know sooner. A lack
of indifference despite the equality of the outcomes has been found
to be widely true even if the knowledge cannot influence the
outcome, and, at least in other experiments, even if this choice is
expensive [8,9,11–13]. In economics, the same anomaly is referred
to in terms of ‘‘temporal resolution of uncertainty’’ [14], explained
by such notions as savoring [15–17], with subjects enjoying the
anticipation of good things to come.
The correct interpretation of this form of observing behavior
has been the subject of substantial debate (see, e.g. [9]).
Superficially attractive theories, such as a desire to gain Shannon
information [18] have been dealt fatal blows, for instance with
animals preferring to observe more even when the number of bits
they receive by doing so is less (e.g., as the probability of getting the
large reward becomes smaller than 0:5, [12]).
A recent study on observing behavior in macaques [10] has
offered a new perspective on the problem. These authors recorded
from putative dopamine neurons in the midbrain whilst monkeys
chose to observe. According to a common theory, these neurons
report a temporal difference error in predictions of future reward
[19,20] as in reinforcement learning accounts of optimal
instrumental choice [21]. Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka [10]
showed that: (a) the macaques did observe; and furthermore (b) the
activity of dopamine neurons was associated with the choice they
make. However, although the behavior and activity are mutually
consistent, observing behavior offers no instrumental benefit and
therefore it should also not be associated with any prediction
errors. Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka suggested that this means
that the dopamine cells are reporting on some aspects of the
benefit of information gathering in addition to aspects of reward.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which this form of
observing behavior can be explained by temporal difference
learning, coupled with the same mechanism that provides an
account of a wide range of departures from normative choice,
namely a Pavlovian influence over instrumental actions [4]. In
particular, we assume that subjects only make associative
predictions when they are appropriately engaged in the task. If
the level of this engagement is influenced by the size of the
predictions (the putatively Pavlovian effect), then stimuli predicting
certain or deterministic large future rewards (one outcome of an
observing choice) will lead to more engagement than stimuli that
leave uncertain the magnitude of the future rewards. This idea can
be seen as a realization of the suggestion made by Dinsmoor [9]
that the predictions of future reward associated with stimuli
influence the attention paid to them. We show that occasional
failures of engagement, modeled as a breakdown in the working
memory for the representational state, can lead directly to both the
preference for observing and the apparently anomalous dopamine
activity, without need for any reference to ‘information’. We also
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in this model.
Results
Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka’s experiment (see Methods and
Figure 1) involved the most precise conditions for establishing
observing behavior. On each trial, thirsty subjects had a 50%
chance of receiving a small or large volume of water directly into
their mouths. There were three sorts of trials: forced-information,
forced-random and free choice. On forced-information trials, the
subjects were presented with a single target (CD; just an orange
square in the figure) and, after looking at it, would receive one of
two cues (Sz; an orange ‘+’, or S{; an orange ‘{’) according to
the volume they were to receive in a couple of seconds. On forced-
random trials, looking at the single target (CND; green square) led
again to one of two cues (SND1; green ‘*’, or SND2; green ‘o’).
However, either of these could be followed by either small or large
rewards; and thus they provided no discriminative information
about the forthcoming reward. Finally, on free choice trials, both
orange and green targets were provided, and the subjects could
choose whether to receive the discriminative (orange) or non-
discriminative (green) cues.
Figures 2a;b show primary behavioral results from the study for
two subjects – both gradually expressed a bias towards the
discriminative (orange) option in the free-choice trials. As
Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka stressed, under a standard
associative learning or temporal difference scheme, there is no
difference between the expected reward for the discriminating and
non-discriminating option, and so no reason to expect this strong
and enduring preference.
We built a model of this which, with one critical exception that
we discuss below, involves a standard temporal difference learning
algorithm [21,22]. Forced-choice and free-choice trials permit
learning about the future expected rewards associated with the
various targets and stimuli, training the values of the states. Then,
on free-choice trials, the selection depends on the relative values,
via a softmax function (see methods). Figure 2c;d shows the results
from simulations of our model, with parameters chosen to match
Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka’s two subjects. The model closely
matches qualitative features of the monkeys’ performances.
In standard models such as this, in which there is a delay
between the presentation of cues and the rewards that they
predict, an assumption has to be made about the way that the
subjects maintain knowledge about their state in the task, and
indeed keep time. Many different possibilities have been explored,
from delay lines to complex patterns of activity evolving in
dynamical recurrent networks (e.g., [23–28]). All of these amount
to forms of working memory – and so present the minimal
requirement that the subjects continue to be engaged in the task
throughout the delay in sufficiently intense a manner as to
maintain this ongoing memory. Thus the critical exception to
conventional temporal difference learning in our model is to
assume that this maintained engagement is influenced by the
current predicted value. That is, if the value is high, then
engagement is readily maintained; if the value is low, then
engagement can be weakened or lost.
Losing engagement is detrimental to the subject in the context
of the present task; by analogy with a similarly detrimental effect in
negative automaintenance, we consider it a form of Pavlovian
misbehavior [4]. Pavlovian responses are typically elicited in an
automatic manner based on appetitive or aversive predictions, and
can exert benign or malign influences over the achievement of
subjects’ apparent goals. Normally, such responses are overt
behaviors; here, along with several recent studies [29,30], we
consider internal responses, associated with the operation of
working memory. Mechanistically, these could come, for instance,
from the influence dopamine itself exerts on the processes
concerned [31].
In the model, we consider engagement to be lost completely on
some trials as a stochastic function of the evolving predicted value.
Such losses have the effect of decreasing the subjective value of
cues and states associated with lower values below their objective
worth; in particular exerting a negative bias on the non-
discriminative cues (SND1;S ND2) compared with the discriminative
cue associated with the large reward (Sz), which will more rarely
experience such losses. Figure 3 shows the effective probability of
disengagement at different timepoints as well as showing the effect
this has on the expected reward. Disengagement associated with
S{ is benign, since the outcome on those trials is modelled as
Figure 1. Experimental setup for a free-choice trial, similar to
Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka [10]. The monkey performs its
choice (CD or CND) according to color, and the discriminating/random
stimulus is presented. At the end of the trial either a large (1 ml) or tiny
(0.04 ml) amount of water is delivered.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000903.g001
Author Summary
The theory of Reinforcement Learning (RL) has been
influential in explaining basic learning and behavior in
humans and other animals, and in accounting for key
features of the activity of dopamine neurons. However,
perhaps due to this very success, paradigms that challenge
RL are at a premium. One case concerns so-called
‘observing behavior’, in which, at least in some versions,
animals elect to observe cues that are predictive of future
rewarding outcomes, although the observations them-
selves have no direct behavioral relevance. In a recent
experiment on observing, the activity of monkey dopami-
nergic neurons was also found to be incompatible with
classic RL. However, as is often the case, this was a task
that allowed for potential interactions from a secondary
behavioral system in which responses are directly trig-
gered by values. In this paper we show that a model
incorporating a next order of refinement associated with
such Pavlovian interactions can explain this type of
observing behavior.
‘Observing Behavior’
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choosing the discriminative option on free-choice trials, as is
evident in Figure 2c;d.
The difference between the parameters for Figures 2c;d is in the
parameter b governing the strength of the competition in the
softmax (b~50 and b~20 for Figure 2c;d respectively). Monkey
V’s results are consistent with a larger value of b than monkey Z;
smaller b leads to more stochasticity and a lower overall degree of
preference. The asymptotic preference for observing is monotonic
in b.
Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka [10] also recorded the activity
of putative midbrain dopaminergic cells during the performance of
the task. Figure 4a shows the activity of an example neuron in the
various conditions. The population response is similar (Figure 4 of
[10]) albeit, as has often been seen, with an initial brief activation
to the forced choice non-discriminative case, likely because of
generalization [32]. Firing at the time of the discriminative or non-
discriminative cues (marked ‘cue’) and the delivery or non-delivery
of reward (‘reward’) is just as expected from the standard
interpretation of these neurons, i.e., that they report the temporal
difference prediction error in the delivery of future reward [19,20].
However, it is their activity at the time of the targets indicating
the forced-informative or forced-random trials (marked ‘target’)
that is revealing about observing. The target indicating a forced-
informative trial was associated with a small but significant phasic
increase in activity; whereas that indicating the random cues was
followed by a small decrease in the firing rate. Under the temporal
difference interpretation of the neurons, this is consistent with the
preference exhibited by the monkeys, but not with the objective
value of the options.
Figure 4b shows modelled dopamine activity in the variable
engagement temporal difference model (here, negative prediction
errors have been compressed compared with positive ones, see
methods; [33,34]). This shows exactly the same pattern shown in
the monkey data. Note that, once the subject has learned the
associations and learned the preference for choosing the
discriminative option in the free choice trials, these trials will
overall be more frequent than the forced-random trials, and so the
negative prediction error associated with the latter will be larger
than the positive prediction error associated with the former.
Figure 5 decomposes the modelled responses in the cases that
there is successful and failed engagement between cues and reward
or non-reward. The most significant effect of the complete failure
to engage given an non-discriminative cue, is that if the large
reward is provided, then there is a greater response than expected
from a 50% prediction. The possibility of using this to test the
theory is discussed below.
In a version of the task that involved choice between immediate
or delayed information about upcoming rewards, Bromberg-
Martin and Hikosaka [10] further showed that switching the colors
of the cues without warning led to a slow reversal of the observing
choice (Figure 6a;b). Figure 6c;d shows the same for the model
using identical softmax parameters to those in Figure 2c;d. The
switch in preference evolves at a similarly glacial pace.
Various other features of observing can be examined through
the medium of the model. Figure 7a;b show the consequence of
Figure 2. Comparing observing in monkeys and the model. a–b) Observing in two monkeys performing the task, from Bromberg-Martin and
Hikosaka [10]. The dotted lines correspond to the Clopper-Pearson 95 percent confidence interval. c–d) Two examples of observing produced by the
model. The parameters for the two plots differ only by the parameter b, the inverse temperature in the softmax. Each session is 480 trials in the
simulations (160 choice trials).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000903.g002
‘Observing Behavior’
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rather than appetitive. One key question in this case is whether
failure to engage is controlled more by salience or valence.
Figure 7a shows the former case, for which a prediction of a large
punishment also protects engagement (symmetrically with reward;
inset plot). In this case, subjects prefer the random to the
discriminative cues, since disengagement leads to subjective
preference. Such preference for random cues might also come
from adding a fixed value to all the potential rewards, thus
allowing the moderately large disengagement in S{ to have a
subtractive value on its expected values (Bromberg-Martin,
personal communication, 2010). However such an effect would
likely be small.
Figure 7b shows the case in which valence (from appetitive to
aversive) determines disengagement, with predictions of punish-
ments leading to more failures of engagement than small rewards.
This again supports observing behavior. Unfortunately, experi-
mental tests of the case involving punishment [35] have not
enjoyed the precision of the paradigm adopted by Bromberg-
Martin and Hikosaka, leaving open the question as to which of
these patterns arises.
Another important experimental manipulation has been to vary
the probability Prew of the larger versus the smaller reward. As
Prew decreases from 1 towards 0.5 there is an increase in the
observing bias (i.e., a greater tendency to choose the discriminative
option). Below this, the nature of the bias depends on the
assumption about how the choices are generated. A choice rule
that depends on the difference in expected values (VD{VND)
leads to a bias that ultimately decreases towards 0 as these values
themselves decrease towards 0. However, the bias is asymmetric
about Prew~0:5 (black curve in Figure 7c). If, instead, the choices
are based on the ratio of the values (VD=VND), the choice bias can
continue to increase as Prew approaches 0 (red curve). Just such an
increase in observing was shown by Roper and Zentall [12] as
reward schedules thinned. While some studies have also
manipulated the size of the reward [36–38], our model does not
make any direct predictions about this. It is possible that
adaptation would scale the response to the overall sizes of
available rewards (as indeed found for phasic dopamine activity in
[39]), and the metrics of this would have to be known in order to
make predictions about disengagement.
One extra factor that is important for analysing behavior is that
the biases inherent in disengagement are small and develop over a
long time-scale, consistent with the stately progress evident in
Figure 2. However, this means that the initial course of learning
can be subject to significant influence from the initial values
ascribed to the different options, leading to biases that are
incommensurate with the final, long term, state. Figure 7d shows
an example. For the blue curve, the initial values of all states are
low (0), but the probability of a reward is high (0:75); for the red
curve, the initial values are high (1), but the probability of a reward
is low (0:25). In the former case, there is substantial initial over-
observation; in the latter, initial under-observation.
Discussion
We have provided an account of ‘observing behavior’ that
shows how it can arise from a small Pavlovian bias over
instrumental behavior associated with disengagement from a task,
rather than any aspect of information seeking. Pavlovian biases are
rife in decision-making; and accommodating them does not
necessitate any further change to the standard underlying theory
of the activity of dopaminergic neurons that has not already been
suggested to accommodate other data. What we have done here is
specify the shape of such an interaction based on disengagement in
the task. We intended specifically to capture [10] experiment on
macaques. However our results do touch upon other, but
emphatically not all, instances of observing in the literature.
Experiments such as [10] into observing are designed to
maximize the effects of what is a relatively small anomaly in
Figure 3. The mechanics of the model. a) The probability of
disengagement at different timepoints for the task in Figure 1
(conditional on having not disengaged at prior timesteps). Similar
color convention as in Figure 1. Orange traces are for discriminative
trials; green for non-discriminative ones; solid lines for the larger reward
or one of the two non-discriminative cues; dashed lines for the smaller
reward. b) The total probability of having disengaged by the time of
reaching state s. c) The expected reward, V, at different timepoints for
the TD model with disengagement. For comparison, the expected
reward for a traditional TD model without disengagement is shown in
transparent colors. Notice that although the chance of disengagement
is high for S{, it has little effect due to the already low value of this
state. By contrast, the moderate engagement for SND1 and SND2 has a
larger effect due to their higher associated value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000903.g003
‘Observing Behavior’
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misbehavior evident in negative automaintenance [2] or the
schedule task [40]). Indeed, in this case, the subjects did not have
to pay a penalty for observing. Thus, under standard decision-
making conditions, we may expect the net effect of disengagement
to be modest, leaving near-optimal behavior within the scope of
the model.
Dinsmoor [9] suggested an account of the phenomenon based
on his observation of ‘selective observing’, i.e., that the subjects
would preferentially focus on stimuli associated with higher
probabilities of reward. This idea met some resistance (some of
which is contained in the commentary to [9]), partly based on
experimental tests in which the subjects were not able to avoid the
low value predictive cues. Our account can be seen as a form of
selective observing, but involving internal actions associated with
the allocation of engagement and attention, rather than external
actions involving preferential looking. It might seem that these
accounts are close to Mackintosh’s [41] suggestion that attention is
preferentially paid to stimuli that are strong predictors of
affectively important outcomes. However, in Mackintosh’s ac-
count, attention particularly influences the speed of learning (the
associability of the stimulus) rather than the fact of it (at least in the
absence of competing predictors), and so would not have the
asymptotic effect that is apparent in the experiments we have
discussed.
Another interesting account of observing is Daly and Daly’s
DMOD [42], which learns predictions associated with frustration
(when reward is expected, but does not arrive), and courage (when
reward is actually delivered during a state of frustration). These
extra predictions warp the net expected values associated with the
different cases in observing, favoring observing responses. The
theory underlying DMOD is the original Rescorla-Wagner [43]
version of the delta rule [44], whose substantial modification by
Sutton and Barto [45] to account for secondary conditioning led to
the original prediction error treatment of the activity of dopamine
neurons in appetitive conditioning [19]. It would be necessary to
extend DMOD in a similar way, and to make an assumption
about which of its three prediction errors (or other quantities) are
reflected in the activity of dopamine neurons, in order to
determine its match to the neurophysiological data. The failure
of TD models to capture behavioral aspects of frustration is,
however, notable.
To some tastes, the most theoretically appealing accounts of
observing start from the notion that animals seek to acquire
information about the world [46]. However, formal informational
theories have difficulty with the results of reducing the probability of
reward (Figure 7c; [12]), which reduce the uncertainty and the
information gained, but increase observing. More informal theories,
such as that suggested by [10] require more precise specification to
be tested against accounts such as the one here. The sloth of initial
learning and reversal apparent in Figure 6 (taking 1200–2400
choice trials, 3000–7000 trials overall) might be considered
suggestive evidence against an informational account, since it
implies at the very least a nugatory value for the information.
Figure 4. Comparison of neuronal firing and the modeled TD signal. a) An example of the firing rate of a single dopamine neuron during
forced trials, based on data from [10]. The various trial types are marked on the plot; briefly orange traces are for discriminative trials; green for non-
discriminative ones; solid lines for the larger reward, when known (or one of the two non-discriminative cues); dashed lines for the smaller reward (or
the other non-discriminative cue). b) The modeled average TD signal at different time points in a trial using the same conventions as in (a). In order to
facilitate the visual comparison of model and data in this figure, we truncated the negative part of the modeled TD signal at 25% of the maximal
positive response of the neuron.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000903.g004
‘Observing Behavior’
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 5 September 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | e1000903In terms of our account, there are various routes by which
predicted values could influence persistent engagement. Failure to
engage can be seen as the same sort of malign Pavlovian influence
over behavior that is implicated in the poor performance of
monkeys in tasks in which they know themselves to be several steps
away from reward [40,47]. In that paradigm, it is an explicitly
informative cue that the reward is disappointingly far away that
leads to disengagement; this parallels the disappointment associ-
ated with the non-discriminative cue in observing. The most
obvious mechanism associated with engagement is the influence of
dopamine itself over working memory [31]; however, whether this
is the phasic dopamine signal associated with prediction errors for
reward [19] or a more tonic dopamine signal associated with a
longer term average reward rate [48,49] is not clear. Alternatively,
some theories suggest that working memory is controlled by a
gating process [29,30] associated with the basal ganglia, treating
internally- and externally directed action in a uniform manner.
Dopamine certainly influences the vigor associated with external
actions [48–50]; it is therefore reasonable to assume that it might
also influence internal engagement.
We specialized our description of the model to the particulars of
the experiment conducted by Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka
[10]. The most important question for other cases concerns the
conditions under which re-engagement occurs. Since disengage-
ment is seemingly rather rare, it is hard to get many hints from this
experiment, and we might assume that it is reward delivery itself
that causes re-engagement. However in a more general setup (e.g.
without reward delivery at fixed time points), a mechanism for re-
engagement is necessary. One possible way to do that would be by
stochastically re-engaging based on either the reward prediction
error or expected value. Such a mechanism of re-engagement
could happen at any time point but would be extremely likely to
happen at the delivery of reward, as well as for the initiation of a
new trial. To be fully generalizable we also need to specify the case
for disengagement at the time of an action selection. While in a
disengaged state we envision the animal not performing an explicit
choice, thus potentially not responding within an allocated time. If
a choice is required to progress in the behavioral setup it would
happen after an eventual re-engagement.
The model raises some further questions. First, we assumed that
the probability of disengagement is a function of the actual
prediction. However, it is possible that this function scales with the
overall magnitude or scale of possible rewards, making the degree
of observing relative rather than absolute. There is a report that
phasic dopamine itself scales in an adaptive manner [39,51], and
this would be a natural substrate.
A second issue is whether disengagement is occasioned by the
change in predictions associated with the phasic dopamine
activity, or the level of the prediction itself. If the former, then
in tasks such as the one studied by Bromberg-Martin and
Hikosaka [10], where substantial prediction errors only happen
with phasic targets and cues, the state could, for instance, just be
poorly established in working memory at the outset, because of a
weak dopamine signal, and this could lead to a subsequent chance
of disengagement. We adopted the simpler scheme in which it is
the ongoing predictive value that controls the chance of
disengagement. One experiment that hints in the direction of
change is that of Spetch et al. [52] (for a more recent study see
[53]). In this, pigeons were given the choice between a certain
(100%) or uncertain (50%, but observed) reward. Surprisingly, the
level of engagement to the latter (measured by the number of pecks
to the illuminated key) was many times to that of the former, and
the pigeons duly made the suboptimal choice. The model
presented in this paper does tie engagement to choice in a similar
way, but we would be unable to explain such a strong effect. A
variant of the model for which engagement is governed by
prediction errors rather than predictions would show some
contrast effect that could favor the uncertain, but observed,
reward. However, it would be hard to explain such a stark
contrast.
A third issue is whether disengagement is complete (and
stochastic), or partial (and, at least possibly, deterministic). We
considered the former case, and indeed, this leads to a
straightforward prediction that the histogram of the dopamine
response at the time of a delivered reward in the non-
discriminative case might have two peaks; one associated with
continuing engagement to the point of reward; the other, which
would be roughly twice as high, associated with prior disengage-
ment. However, it is also possible that less dramatic changes in
engagement occur during the interval between cues and reward. If
many individual neural elements are involved in the engagement
(for instance in working memory circuits devoted to timing), then
some could disengage before others. This might even lead to a
non-uniform behavior among different dopamine cells. Unfortu-
Figure 5. An illustrative example of the modeled temporal
difference signal for each of the four conditions. The coloured
line indicates the regular temporal difference term, with the following
color convention: orange represents a discriminating choice, green is
the non-discriminating option, while the complete line is for a
rewarding trial, the dotted line for a non rewarding trial. The vertically
off-set black line represents the temporal difference signal for a failure
after the time of the revealing (indicated by the black dotted line) of the
stimulus due to Pavlovian dis-engagement. Notice that the dis-
engagement is an unlikely event that relatively rarely elicits a dip in
the TD signal, whereas, e.g., the delivery of an unexpected reward elicits
the typically robust response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000903.g005
‘Observing Behavior’
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discriminate between these various possibilities.
Finally, the question arises as to the computational rationale for
value-dependent disengagement. Other instances of Pavlovian
misbehavior, such as withdrawal from cues associated with
predictions of low values, can find plausible justifications in terms
of evolutionary optimality. Disengagement might be seen in the
same way, as a Pavlovian spur to exploration [54] in the face of
poor expected returns.
From the perspective of conditioned reinforcement, our account
suggests that the issue that is often studied is not really the one that
is critical. Various investigators (see, for instance, the ample
discussion in Lieberman et al. 1997 [55] about the differences
between their findings and those of Fantino and Case 1983 [56])
have considered whether stimuli like Sz are conditioned
reinforcers because of their association with the reward. For us,
Sz and SND1 and SND2 are all conditioned reinforcers. The key
question for observing behavior is instead an apparent concavity:
the average worth of two different stimuli associated determinis-
tically with small and large rewards is greater than the worth of a
single stimulus associated stochastically with the same outcome
statistics (see [57]). It is this non-linearity that demands
explanation, and not merely the fact, for instance, of savoring or
anticipation of the future reward, which could quite reasonably
also be purely linear. Some accounts put the weight of the non-
linearity onto the stimulus associated surely with the large reward.
By comparison, our account places this emphasis onto the non-
discriminative stimuli, suggesting that they are more likely to lead
to disengagement. The same is true of other sources of non-
linearity, for instance a mechanism that accumulates distress from
the prolonged variance/uncertainty in the non-discriminative
pathway.
Various versions of the ‘observing task’ have also been tested
on humans [55,56,58]. These studies have shown consistent
observing behavior, but, partly because of the different reading of
the issue of conditioned reinforcement to the one discussed
above, have often focused on different questions and methods
from those in Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka [10]. For instance,
one question has been whether subjects would observe if they
only ever found out S{ and never Sz – the idea being that
conditioned reinforcement could support observing of the latter
but not the former. Unfortunately, the answers have been
confusing [55], perhaps partly because of issues about how
cognitive effects (e.g., expectations of controllability) influence the
results. Note, in particular, that we have only modeled observing
behavior associated with repeated experience and learning, and
not the sort of single-instance decisions that are often used in
human cases.
In conclusion we have shown that the often observed effect of
‘observing’, preferring a behaviorally irrelevant discriminating
stimulus cue, can readily be explained by a bias caused by
Pavlovian misbehavior, putting it in the same category as a range
of other suboptimalities. Informational accounts, however seduc-
tive, are not necessary.
Figure 6. Comparison of observing in monkeys and the model for a delayed task. a–b) The biases of two monkeys performing a version of
the observing task in which they were given the choice of receiving immediate or delayed discriminating stimuli, from Bromberg-Martin and
Hikosaka. The colors of the choices switched in the session number indicated in the graph. The dotted lines correspond to the Clopper-Pearson 95
percent confidence interval. c–d) Two examples of biasing in switching, similar to Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka. The parameters for the two plots
differ only by the b in the softmax (same values as in Figure 2c;d).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000903.g006
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We model value learning using a modified version of a standard
temporal difference model [21,22]. We assume the task can be
specified as a Markov process, where the participant estimates the
expected long run future reward (value) of each state s as V(s),
updating it according to
V(s)/V(s)zadV ð1Þ
where a is the learning rate, and dV is the change in expected
value given by:
dV~rzcV(s’){V(s) ð2Þ
where r is the delivered reward, and s’ is the state that follows s.
Learning proceeds for all three sorts of trials (forced disc., forced
non-disc. and choice trials). The modelled dopamine signal for
Figures 4 and 5 is dV.
The only deviation from the standard TD model is in assuming
that the correct updating of this system is dependent on
maintaining engagement, for instance in working memory. We
assume the probability of disengagement of the course of state s to
be
~ 0exp({V(s)y) ð3Þ
per unit of time (in seconds). Hence, for a given state t the
probability of a correct updating is given by 1{Pfail~(1{ )
t,
where t is the amount of time spent in the state (see Figure 1). 0
and y are fixed parameters. We assume the consequence of
disengagement to be the transition to a specific fixed (non-
updating) state s0 of value V(s0)~0 and hence the updating signal
for V(s) is
dV~rzcV(s0){V(s)~{V(s): ð4Þ
The system stays in this state, until a reward is delivered at the
end of the trial. At this point the system is ‘re-engaged’ creating a
TD error relative to the fixed state V(s0) (see Figure 5). We assume
that any potential disengagement in the intertrial interval is
negated by the initiation of a new trial.
Choice is only possible at one state C, between progressing to
either state CD and state CND. Given the learned values, we
assume the subject performs choice D based on the Softmax or
Luce choice rule [59]
P(D)~
exp(bV(CD))
exp(bV(CND))zexp(bV(CD))
: ð5Þ
Note that it is straightforward to see that this version of softmax
is dependent on the difference in values (V(CND){V(CD)),
whereas using the logarithm of the value (as in Figure 7c) causes
the function to be dependent on the ratio of values
(V(CND)=V(CD)).
Figure 7. Effect of varying parameters in the model. a–b) For aversive stimuli (punishment) the shape of the memory retention as a function of
the expected value has a large effect on the bias towards observing. A symmetric function (a) leads to less observing, an asymmetric function (b)
leads to more observing. The dotted lines indicates the Clopper-Pearson 95 percent confidence interval. c) Given appetitive stimuli, the rate of reward
Prew can have different effects on the tendency to choose the discriminating option, based on the version of softmax used. The iterative solution to
the self-consistency requirement (6) using the softmax from Eq. 5 (black) is plotted, as well as the iterative solution for choices based on the logarithm
of the learned value (red). Mean choice bias for Monte carlo simulations (with STD) are overlaid for Prew~1=4; 1=3; 1=2; 2=3; 3=4. d) Given initial
starting conditions far from the correct values, initial learning can lead to too strong or weak effects (single runs; initial values of all states are 0 and 1
and Prew~0:75; 0:25 for the blue and red curves respectively).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000903.g007
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would approach the true value V (s)~rzcE½V (s’) , where the
expectation is taken over states s’. However with a chance of
failure Pfail(V (s)) dependent on the value, the iterative solution
in Figure 7c can be given by solving
V (s)~rzcE½V (s’)   (1{Pfail(V (s))) : ð6Þ
numerically.
For all figures we assumed a~0:005 and c~1. For Figs. 2 and 6
we used parameters, b~½50, 20 , 0~0:3 and y~3. For the
aversive stimuli in Figure 7a–b we assumed negative reward
values. For Figure 7a the parameters were b~50, 0~0:3, y~3.
For Figure 7b the parameters were b~40, 0~0:2, y~2. For
Figure 7d the parameters were b~20, 0~0:3, y~3. To mimic
the fact that dopamine neurons have less dynamic range for
increases than decreases in firing rate, for Figure 4 we truncated
the negative responses at 225 percent of the maximal positive
response of the neuron.
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